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1.   Introduction  
The perception of income fairness has a profound influence on human behavior. 
Fairness not only affects the individual incentive to work, but also can avoid social problems 
between workers and capitalists. In the literature, income fairness is related to efficiency 
wages.  
Solow (1979) and Akerlof (1982) suggested that a worker’s effort is a function of the 
perceived fairness of the actual wage in relation to a reference wage.  According to the basic 
fair wage-effort hypothesis, the number of units of effective labor input is in proportion to the 
ratio of the actual wage to the fair wage (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990).  Akerlof and Yellen 
extend this theory to show how the fair wage of a given group is a weighted average of the 
wage received by an intra-firm reference group and the market-clearing wage (p.271).  They 
also show that, if the two types of labor do not work together, inefficient equilibria can occur.  
Equilibrium conditions illustrate how changes in labor supply and/or productivity can affect 
wages and unemployment (p. 275-76).  Except for the case of perfect labor substitution, 
fairness will affect resource allocation and production efficiency (p. 281). According to Seidel 
(2010), fair wage is directly related to profits.  As profits rise, workers increase the wage 
considered to be fair (p.215).   However, the models in the literature investigate the situation 
for developed economics and neglect developing economies, in which uneven development 
between sectors prevails.             
The purpose of this paper is thus to consider wage fairness in developing economies 
with a dual structure consisting of urban manufacturing and rural agricultural sectors. We 
adopt the Harris-Todaro model (1970) to depict the uneven development of developing 
economies by assuming that the urban wage is higher than the rural wage.  Rather than fixing 
the urban wage rate as in the Harris-Todaro model, we consider an urban fair wage rate that is 
the weighted average of the actual wage and the rate of return on capital. To achieve 
production efficiency, urban manufacturing firms offer a fair wage to workers. The ensuing 
above market-clearing fair wage rate leads to migration from rural to urban areas, resulting in 
urban unemployment. In addition, the higher wage raises the cost of production and lowers 
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the output of manufacturing firms. Capital is then released to the rural sector, thereby pushing 
up the rural wage rate.  However, the gap between urban and rural wages still widens, because 
the beneficial effect on the rural wage of capital reallocation to the rural sector is relatively 
small. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2, “The Model” presents 
a dual production model of a developing economy, in which a fair wage rate prevails in the 
urban manufacturing sector. Using this production structure, we examine the effects of a fair 
wage on income distribution and social welfare in the economy. Section 3, “Analysis” 
formally investigates the effect of a rise in pay fairness for urban workers on the relative 
wages of urban and rural labor.  Section 4, “Conclusions” offers some concluding remarks. 
2. The Model 
Consider a developing economy in which a distinctive feature is the dual structure of 
uneven development between the modern urban and traditional rural sectors. Firms in the 
urban sector produce manufactured good X, and the rural sector produces agricultural good Y. 
Labor (Li) and capital (Ki) are employed to produce both goods. Nonetheless, imperfect 
monitoring in the manufacturing sector may mean that workers do not make an effective 
effort to produce good X.  The production function of good X can be thus expressed as X = 
X(eLX, KX), where e ∈ (0, 1] is the level of working effort.1 In the agricultural sector, in 
contrast, there is no shirking and the production function of good Y is Y = Y(LY, KY). Both 
forms of production exhibit constant returns to scale with positive and diminishing marginal 
products, that is, XL > 0 and XLL < 0, etc.  Choosing good Y as the numeraire, the relative price 
of good X is denoted by p. 
Following Harris and Todaro (1970), the uneven development of the dual economy is 
represented by a higher urban wage rate wX than the rural wage wY.  This leads to the 
migration of rural workers to the urban sector, which results in voluntary urban 
unemployment Lu. The expected urban wage rate is thus the probability of employment times 
the actual urban wage rate, (1 – u)wX, where u = Lu/(LX + Lu) is the unemployment rate in the 
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urban sector. In equilibrium the rural-urban migration stops when the expected urban wage 
rate equals the rural wage:2 
(1 – u)wX = wY.                                  (1) 
Note that the rural wage rate is determined by the value marginal product of labor in the 
agricultural sector Y, that is, wY = YL(LY, KY). However, distinct from the institutionally set 
urban wage rate considered in the Harris-Todaro model, urban workers in this developing 
economy have become aware of income fairness and use returns to capitalists, denoted by r, 
as their reference income. By balancing the pay of capitalists and workers, a fair urban wage, 
*
Xw , can be set as the weighted average of the return on capital and the expected urban wage: 
*
Xw = αr + (1 - α)(1 – u)wX, where the parameter α ∈ (0, 1) represents the fair wage 
coefficient.3 It is assumed that the return on capital exceeds the urban wage (r > wX).  Thus, 
the effort level of urban workers can be described by e = min [wX/ *Xw , 1]. To achieve better 
production efficiency, urban manufacturing firms offer the fair wage rate (i.e., wX = *Xw ) to 
workers. This yields the following relation between the urban wage and the return on capital:    
wX = {α/[α + u(1 - α)]}r.                                   (2) 
As 0 < α < 1, we assure that wX < r.  Essentially, the greater fairness achieved by a larger α 
increases the urban wage rate.  It is close to the return on capital (wX = r) when α approaches 
1.    
We next consider the goods market. In a perfectly competitive market, unit prices 
equal unit costs to assure zero profits in equilibrium. Letting ci( . ) denote the unit cost 
function of good i, the zero-profit conditions of the goods markets require that 
cX(wX, r) = p,                       (3) 
cY(wY, r) = 1.                                                           (4) 
Note that the partial derivative of the unit cost function with respect to an input price gives the 
corresponding unit input demand.  For instance, Xwc  expresses the unit labor requirement to 
produce good X.  The employment conditions for labor and capital therefore must thus satisfy 
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X
wc (wX, r)X/(1 – u) + 
Y
wc (wY, r)Y = L,                               (5) 
X
rc (wX, r)X + 
Y
rc (wY, r)Y = K,          (6) 
where L and K are, respectively, the endowment of labor and capital in the economy.4 
  Turning to the demand side of the economy, the expenditure function is defined as: 
E(p, v) = min {pDX + DY: v(DX, DY) = v}, where Di denotes the demand for good i and v is the 
level of utility.  By the envelop property, we have Ep = DX, which is the compensated demand 
for good X.  In addition, Ev > 0, which denotes the inverse of the marginal utility of income.  
The budget constraint of the economy requires the equality of expenditure on goods and 
revenue from production 
 E(p, v) = pX + Y.                                (7) 
The economy described in (1) – (7) contains seven unknowns, u, wX, r, wY, X, Y and v, 
and the parameter α for a fair wage.  We use this model to examine the effects of pay fairness 
on income distribution and social welfare in the economy. 
 
3. Analysis 
The production side of the economy represented by (1) – (6) is block recursive.  
Hence, the four unknowns, u, wX, r and wY, can be solved from (1) – (4) as functions of the 
fairness parameter . Differentiating these equations and letting θji denote the cost share of 
factor j in producing good i,5 we can obtain the effects of a rise in pay fairness α on factor 
returns and the urban unemployment rate, as follows 
Xwˆ /αˆ  = u
2θKXθLY/(1 – u)[α + u(1 - α)]J > 0,         (8) 
rˆ /αˆ  = - u2θLXθLY/(1 – u)[α + u(1 - α)]J < 0,         (9) 
Ywˆ /αˆ  = u
2θLXθKY/(1 – u)[α + u(1 - α)]J > 0,         (10) 
uˆ /αˆ  = uθ/[α + u(1 - α)]J > 0,                     (11) 
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where J = uθLY/(1 – u) + u(1 - α)θ/[α + u(1 - α)] > 0 under the stability condition that the 
urban manufacturing sector is more capital intensive than the rural agricultural sector, that is, 
θ = θKXθLY > θLXθKY.6   
The income distribution effect, given in (8) – (10), of an increase in fairness α can be 
explained and illustrated by Figure 1, in which the diagram on the right-hand side expresses 
the positive relationship between wX and r for pay fairness in (2) and the negative sloped unit-
cost loci of r and wX for producing good X in (3). The diagram on the left-hand side depicts 
the unit cost combinations of r and wY for producing good Y in (4).  A rise in α causes a direct 
increase in wX by rotating the fairness equation (2) rightward to (2)’. However, a higher wX 
provides an incentive for rural workers to migrate to the urban sector, leading to higher urban 
unemployment.  This mitigates the pressure on the rise in the urban wage, thereby pulling the 
fairness schedule (2)’ leftward to (2)” in Figure 1. Consequently, a higher urban wage reduces 
the production of good X.  If good X is capital intensive, then more capital will be released to 
sector Y.  This causes the rate of return on capital r to fall and the rural wage rate wY to rise in 
accordance with (4). 
Using (8) and (10), we can infer that the rise in pay fairness in the urban sector 
widens the gap between urban and rural wages, as follows 
Xwˆ /αˆ  - Ywˆ /αˆ  = u
2θ/(1 – u)[α + u(1 - α)]J > 0.             (12) 
This is because pay fairness raises the rural wage indirectly due to the inflow of capital to the 
rural sector. Nonetheless, the indirect rise in the rural wage is smaller than the direct rise in 
the urban wage that results from fairness.7 
We next turn to the welfare effect of fairness. As indicated in (2), a fair wage causes 
the urban wage to exceed its market-clearing rate.  Fairness also enlarges the wage gap 
between the urban and rural sectors. This attracts more workers to the urban sector, resulting 
in urban unemployment. Thus, in accordance with (7), the unemployment distortion affects 
social welfare in the following way 
Ev(dv/dα) = - [wYLX/(1 – u)2](du/dα).                                                (13) 
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As du/dα > 0 by (11), we have dv/dα < 0. Hence, an increase in pay fairness in the urban 
sector reduces social welfare in the economy. 
These results can be summarized in the following proposition 
Proposition:  For a developing economy with uneven development between the rural and 
urban sectors, a rise in pay fairness for urban workers widens the gap between urban and 
rural wages. Greater fairness also worsens the problem of urban unemployment and hence 
lowers social welfare in the economy. 
4.  Conclusions 
Like the Harris and Todaro (1970) paper, this study offers an explanation for urban 
unemployment in the context of urban-rural wage differences.  However, unlike Harris and 
Todaro, who focus on differences in expected earnings from an institutionally set urban wage, 
this paper develops an explanation of the urban-rural wage difference in the context of the fair 
wage literature as exemplified by Akerlof and Yellen (1990. When urban workers become 
aware of income fairness, they use the expected urban wage and weighted average returns to 
capitalists as their fair urban wage.  This perception of fairness raises the urban wage, thereby 
widening the wage gap between the urban and rural sectors. An above market-clearing wage 
rate attracts urban labor and causes unemployment in the urban sector. Greater pay fairness 
worsens the urban unemployment situation. This unfavorable unemployment effect in turn 
lowers social welfare in the economy. 
It is worth noting that in our model the real wage rate in the urban area is rigid in lieu 
of political or institutional considerations whereas wage rate in the rural area is flexible.  By 
using a different framework one could empirically test whether wages in rural areas with high 
unemployment are higher than market clearing wages.  
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Footnotes 
1. See Akerlof and Yellen (1990) and Seidel (2010) for the specifications for a worker’s 
effort in production. 
2. Studies on the Harris-Todaro (1970) model can be found, for example, in Parai and 
Beladi (1997) and Hatzipanayotou and Michael (2001). 
3. Seidel (2010) formulates the fair wage as the weighted average of the wages and profits 
of a firm. 
4. Capital is perfectly mobile between sectors. See Chakrabarti (2009) , Oladi (2004) and 
Gilbert and Oladi (2009) for related studies on capital mobility in general equilibrium 
analyses. 
5. We follow Jones (1965) with this notation. 
6. As shown in the Appendix, the stability of the economy requires this factor intensity 
condition. 
7. See Neary (2002), Marjit, et al. (2003), Kar and Beladi (2004) and Anwar (2009) for 
recent studies on wage inequality.   
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Appendix 
This appendix provides a stability analysis of the model.  Letting a dot over the 
variables denote the time derivative, the adjustments of the system in (3) – (6) can be 
expressed as 
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where λji denotes the employment share of factor j in producing good i. The principle minors 
of the coefficient matrix are 
 ∆1 = ∆2 = ∆3 = 0, 
 ∆4 = λθ + θLX [α + u(1 - α)]λ, 
where A = - B = - (1 - α)(1 – u)(sLX - λLX)/(1 - u) – [sLY + λLX/(1 – u)] and C = - D = (1 - α)(1 – 
u)sKX + sKY.  Note that sKX = xθLXλKX and X = c Xrwc /
X
wc
X
rc .  In addition, we denote λ =  
λKXλLY - λLXλKY/(1 – u)  and  θ = θKXθLY - θLXθKY. 
The stability condition for the foregoing system requires that the odd principles are 
non-positive and the even principle minors are non-negative.  This then requires that λ > 0 
and θ > 0, that is, the urban manufacturing sector X is more capital intensive than the rural 
agricultural sector Y.  
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